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Introduction 
Polish semi-presidentialism evolved from a pacted transition between the leadership 
of the communist regime and the Solidarity opposition movement.  The mechanics of 
semi-presidentialism, as well as its effect on democratisation, depend upon the 
constitution, the party system and the personality of the president.  Poland has had 
three semi-presidential constitutions, a variety of relationships between president and 
government as well as government and parliament, and two very different presidents.  
In the early years, the absence of the conditions for stable semi-presidentialism had a 
negative effect on democratisation.  Later on, conditions were more supportive, and 
semi-presidentialism began to play a more positive role.  Before the introduction of 
semi-presidentialism in November 1990, Polish elites had already established a firm 
consensus on democracy, which was buttressed by consensus on the economic system 
and international relations.  Therefore, the conflicting legitimacies generated by semi-
presidentialism delayed but did not prevent, or seriously threaten, democratic 
consolidation in Poland.   
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Origins 
Some of the concrete institutional characteristics of contemporary Polish semi-
presidentialism are to be found in Polish constitutional history and in the constitutions 
of other contemporary European democracies (Hayden 2006, p. 174; Sanford 2002, 
pp. 76-77). However, semi-presidential institutions were not chosen from a set of 
available constitutional models.  Rather, Polish semi-presidentialism is the result of a 
series of highly political decisions taken under very different and unforeseen 
circumstances.  The first and most important decision was the deal agreed between the 
communist and Solidarity sides at the Round Table talks from February to April 1989.  
The centrepiece of the agreement was a parliamentary election on the basis of a 
unique system of “compartmentalised competition” (Olson 1993).  It reserved 65 per 
cent of the seats in the elections to the lower house of parliament (the Sejm) for the 
communist party and its satellites, while 35 per cent was to be open to competition 
amongst opposition candidates.  Meanwhile, election to a new Senate would be 
entirely free.  The communist side sought the introduction of a new presidency, 
designed for their leader General Jaruzelski.  It would provide a guarantee and 
reassurance to the party-state and the Soviet Union.  The agreement created a 
potentially powerful presidency to be elected by a joint sitting of the houses of 
parliament (Salmonowicz 1989, pp. 10-11).  Thus, the deal established a dual 
executive, rather than semi-presidentialism.   
 
Both sides had very vague ideas about how the system would operate in the 
immediate future (Osiatyński 1996, p. 58).  The agreement simply notes that the 
agreement is “an important step towards the creation of a new democratic order” 
(Salmonowicz 1989, p. 11). In the scenario of democratisation, it was consistent with 
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the explicitly “evolutionary” logic of the round table (Salmonowicz 1989, p. 6) that 
existing institutions would be democratised.  One method of democratising the 
presidency would be direct election, thereby establishing semi-presidentialism.  
Democratisation could also have proceeded by simply democratising the parliament, 
which could then provide democratic legitimacy for a new president elected by its 
members.  Another option would have been to simply abolish the presidency. 
 
Competition was not as compartmentalised as had been planned.  In the June 1989 
election, Poles not only voted overwhelmingly for Solidarity, they voted against 
communism by crossing out names on lists reserved for the communist party. 
Humiliatingly, Jaruzelski had to rely on spoiled Solidarity votes for election to the 
presidency.  The hitherto supine satellite parties defected to the opposition, allowing 
the election in August 1989 of Solidarity’s Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the region’s first 
non-communist prime minister for forty years.  As communism fell in neighbouring 
countries, the communist president Jaruzelski increasingly became an anachronism.   
 
A parliamentary system was the preference of the intellectual wing of Solidarity, 
which dominated Mazowiecki’s government.  By the time Jaruzelski’s role in 
reassuring the Soviets was obviously superfluous, this wing of Solidarity was in open 
war with the charismatic leader of the Solidarity trade union, Lech Wałęsa.  
Mazowiecki thought he would have a better chance against Wałęsa in a popular 
election than in an election by the two houses of parliament (Wołek 2004, p. 126).  
While initially calculating that he could win an election according to the original 
method, Wałęsa, who saw himself very much as a tribune of the people, also came out 
in favour of direct election.  His justification for doing so was the illegitimacy of the 
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“contract Sejm” and the gradualism of the Mazowiecki government.  In September, 
the Sejm changed the constitution to allow the direct election of the president.  
Wałęsa, won 74 per cent of the vote in a run-off against the previously unknown 
émigré populist, Tymiński in December 1990.  Prime minister Mazowiecki had been 
eliminated in the first round with a disastrous 18 per cent.  
 
As early as autumn 1989, the contract Sejm formed a consensus on the procedure for 
writing a new constitution.  There was to be a joint committee of 10 Senators and 46 
Sejm deputies, whose draft would have to be passed by a two-thirds majority in a joint 
sitting of both houses of parliament.  The final requirement was a simple majority in a 
national referendum.  The 1997 Constitution was produced by an essentially similar 
framework adopted by the freely elected Sejm in April 1992.  In both the contract 
Sejm and its successor, political fragmentation precluded any progress.  Moreover, a 
new constitution was simply not necessary for democratisation to proceed.  Like its 
neighbours, Poland was able to proceed on the basis of an amended communist-era 
document.  However, a new constitution was desirable, especially as regards the 
institutions of semi-presidentialism.  In 1992, the Sejm and Senate passed a 
substantial set of constitutional revisions, known as the Little Constitution.  The 
principal aim of these amendments was to regularise the vague and conflict-ridden 
relationship between president, government and Sejm.  This was an explicitly 
temporary measure.  Nonetheless, the Little Constitution’s achievement of a 
consensus on an adjustment and clarification of the basic political structure made 
fundamental changes under a new constitution less likely. 
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In the 1993 parliamentary elections, the one-third of voters that opted for the divided 
mainstream anti-communist right found themselves without parliamentary 
representatives.  A “constitutional coalition” of the post-communist left, peasants, and 
the liberal (ex-opposition) centre took advantage of the opportunity to pass a new 
constitution.  Their work was further facilitated by post-communist Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski’s victory over Wałęsa by 51.7 to 48.3 per cent in the second round of 
the November 1995 presidential election.  The 1997 constitution reduced the 
president’s power to the benefit of the prime minister but most importantly it 
confirmed the semi-presidential system in Poland.   
 
Low turnout and highly disproportional result meant that the Sejm that produced the 
Constitution represented only one third of eligible voters (Jasiewicz 2000, p. 112).  
The Constitution itself was passed by a 53 per cent majority on a 43 per cent turnout.  
Within months the extra-parliamentary right, which had bitterly contested the 
Constitution, had won an election and returned to power.  Thus, many have 
questioned the legitimacy and permanence of the 1997 Constitution (Wyrzykowski 
2001).  However, much of this dissensus related to ideological and historical 
symbolism (see the Constitution’s almost schizophrenic preamble) rather than the 
division of power between institutions (Osiatyński 1997).   For example, the 
constitutions drafted by the post-communist left and the Solidarity Trade Union in 
1994 are very similar to each other and the 1997 Constitution, in terms of major 
presidential powers such as veto override, presidential election, government 
nomination and dismissal.  The big difference is that the right supported presidential 
control of defence, while the left wanted to place defence under the government 
(Chrusćiak 1997). 
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Constitutional Powers 
The greatest potential power afforded to the president by the amended communist 
constitution was to dissolve the Sejm if he judged it to be threatening his ability to 
carry out his responsibilities to safeguard the sovereignty, security and international 
alliances of the state or if it failed to approve a prime minister, a national plan or a 
budget within three months (Article 30.2).  The president also had the exclusive right 
to nominate and propose the dismissal of the prime minister to the Sejm (32.1) and 
must be consulted by the prime minister in the appointment of all ministers (37).  The 
president had the power to act in foreign affairs and defence without the co-signature 
of the prime minister.  He had very significant powers of non-ministerial appointment, 
with and without the necessity of parliamentary approval (32.f.1, 40, 61.4, 65.1).  The 
president had a right of legislative initiative (20.4) and could refer a bill to the 
Constitutional Tribunal for a decision on its constitutionality (27.4).  The Sejm needed 
a two-thirds majority to override his legislative veto.  There was no line-item veto. 
 
I will now mention the principal changes introduced by subsequent constitutions.  
According to the Little Constitution (signed into law in November 1992), the 
president could no longer dissolve the Sejm for interfering with his responsibilities, or 
for not producing a national plan.  A new more complicated system of government 
formation was introduced.  Initially, the president nominates the prime minister. The 
Sejm must approve the prime minister and his cabinet by absolute majority.  If the 
president’s nomination is unsuccessful the Sejm can choose a prime minister and 
cabinet by absolute majority.  If it fails to do so, the initiative returns to the president, 
whose choice, together with his cabinet, can, this time, be approved by simple 
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majority.  Upon failure, the Sejm needs only a simple majority for its candidate.  If 
the Sejm again fails to appoint a prime minister, the president can dissolve the Sejm 
immediately or appoint a prime minister without the confidence of the Sejm.  If the 
prime minister and his cabinet do not win a confidence vote within six months, the 
president is obliged to dissolve the Sejm (Articles 57-62).  To remove the 
government, the Sejm was given the option of passing either a simple or a 
constructive vote of no confidence.  If the vote was not constructive, the president 
could choose to accept the resignation of the government or to dissolve the Sejm 
(Article 66).  The prime minister was only required to consult the president about the 
appointment of the ministers of foreign affairs, defence and the interior ministry.  The 
president was to exercise “general supervision” of defence and international affairs, 
and foreign policy was to be conducted “through” the minister of foreign affairs.  
There were some reductions in the president’s powers of appointment.  The 
government could drastically shorten the legislative procedure by simply declaring the 
matter “urgent” (16).   
 
The 1997 constitution shortens the process of government formation.  If the Sejm’s 
candidate fails to gain an absolute majority, the president can nominate a candidate, 
whose cabinet can be approved by simple majority.  If this candidate is unsuccessful 
the president is simply obliged to dissolve the Sejm (Article 155).  A constructive 
vote of no confidence is the only way of removing the government (Article 158).  The 
president is given no role in the appointment of ministers (Article 154).  There is 
another vague downgrading of the President’s special responsibilities (Article 133.3, 
134.2).  In contrast, he receives greater powers of appointment (Article 144.20-27).  
The veto override is reduced to a three-fifths majority of the Sejm (Article 122.5).  
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Presidential acts, which require co-signature, can only be signed by the prime 
ministers, rather than relevant ministers as previously was the case.  In 1999, a 
number of legislative and administrative changes were implemented with the effect of 
significantly increasing the prime minister’s control over the cabinet (Sanford 2002, 
pp. 156-157). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Functioning of the system 
The constitution is of only limited use in understanding how Polish semi-
presidentialism actually works.  Most scholars of Polish semi-presidentialism react to 
the limits of constitutionalism by providing a narrative of political events (Jasiewicz 
1997; Michta 1998; Millard 1994; Millard 2000; Van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 
1999; Wiatr et al. 2003).  Instead of repeating and extending these excellent 
narratives, I adopt a more analytical approach, which argues that the operation of 
Poland’s semi-presidential system can be understood as the interaction of four factors: 
the constitutional powers of the president, the holder of the presidency (Millard 1999, 
pp. 31-32; Millard 2000), the relationship of the government to the president and the 
relationship of the government to the Sejm.  Nine permutations of these factors 
occurred in practice (see Table 2).  In other words, the functioning of the system has 
varied very substantially over time.  This section will begin with a brief outline of the 
personality and party political factors.  It will then proceed to evaluate the roles of the 
president and prime minister in Polish government and politics. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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Presidents 
President Wałęsa had a politically hyperactive conception of the presidency.  He did 
not see his elevation to the presidency as requiring a more consensual political stance.  
He maintained a consistently, and sometimes stridently, right-wing position. Wałęsa 
frequently tried to go beyond his constitutional powers and to use them in ways that 
were never intended.  Wałęsa won many tactical victories.  Nevertheless, his 
aggressive politics, and spectacular failure to build alliances with individuals, never 
mind parties, meant that his presidency was largely conducted from a situation of 
embattled, but prominent, isolation.  Wałęsa favoured the development of a strong 
presidency, but he never seems to have been tempted by the notion of a hands-on 
governing presidency.  While he often interfered in government and ministerial 
policy, he clearly saw the ongoing co-ordination, development and implementation of 
policy as the responsibility of the government.  He envisioned his role rather as laying 
the correct political foundations for correct policy. 
 
Kwaśniewski’s idea of the presidency was in many respects the opposite of Wałęsa’s.  
His conception was consensual and strategic.  He wanted to be the president “of all 
the Poles”.  Kwaśniewski had built the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), post-
communist Poland’s, most, or even only, successful political party.  He cultivated 
good relations with a wide range of politicians, as well as journalists, businesspeople 
and others.  Unsurprisingly, he worked within the Constitution, since most of his 
tenure was under the 1997 Constitution, on which he was perhaps the greatest single 
influence.  Kwaśniewski generally used his powers to further the aims of the general 
consensus on democracy, international integration, and free markets which embraced 
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most of the Polish political spectrum, but was also ready to exercise power for the 
benefit of the left.  He rarely fought battles he could not win.   
 
Poland’s latest president, Lech Kaczyński, was once the right-hand man of President 
Wałęsa.  The early months of his tenure suggest his conception of the presidency is 
more reminiscent of Wałęsa’s active approach than Kwaśniewski’s strategic 
approach.   Kaczyński has aggressively pushed his constitutional powers to the limit 
in the pursuit of partisan advantage.  In contrast to Wałęsa, Kaczyński has long been 
committed to political parties.  The current minority government is based on the Law 
and Justice party, founded and controlled by the president and his twin Jarosław.  This 
puts him in a much stronger position than that Wałęsa suffered for most of his term of 
office.  So far, Kaczyński’s tactical victories have not enabled him to provide, or to 
bypass, the parliamentary majority necessary to push through right-wing policies. 
 
Party Competition 
The next two factors, the government’s relation to the president and the Sejm, are 
largely effects of party competition.  The Polish issue space is basically two-
dimensional (Kitschelt et al. 1999, p. 233), but political vocabulary is one-
dimensional.  The first dimension of Polish party competition is a continuum from 
secularist, universalist, post-communists to Catholic, nationalist, anti-communists.  
The second dimension is the familiar continuum of economic intervention.  Polish 
parties are more clearly distinguished on the first than the second dimension (Szawiel 
1999; Szczerbiak 1999; Szczerbiak 2003).  The left is secularist and social 
democratic.  It has consistently been represented by the SLD, which has also tended to 
be a party of business.  The centre tends to be culturally moderate and pro-market.  
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The Democratic Union (UD), the Freedom Union (UW) and the Civic Platform (PO) 
have represented the centre. The right is Catholic.  Some of its policies and rhetoric 
have been pro-market, while others have been pro-union or have increased social 
spending.  Its party political representation has been fragmented and unstable.  A 
diverse array of populist forces has been more difficult to fit into these dimensional 
schemes.  The most consistently important of these parties has been the Peasant Party 
(PSL). 
 
Throughout his term, President Wałęsa effectively had no party political base, with 
the minor exception of the Non-party Bloc for the Support of the Reforms (BBWR). 
Wałęsa began his tenure with a centre-right minority coalition government.  He then 
cohabited with a right-wing minority coalition and centre-right minority coalition.  
These governments were not ideologically opposed to him, or, in terms of presidential 
elections, electorally opposed to him, but they were effectively rivals in the 
government of Poland.  He ended his tenure cohabiting with a majority coalition of 
leftists and peasants.  Kwaśniewski began his term with his own party as the senior 
governing party.  He then cohabited with a majority centre-right coalition, which 
became a minority right-wing government, when the Freedom Union exited.  The left-
peasant coalition then returned to power.  With the ejection of the peasants, this 
became a minority government. 
 
Prime Ministers and Governments  
In this sub-section, I examine various elements of the power of the Polish president 
and prime minister.  The election of President Wałęsa highlighted the illegitimacy of 
the “contract Sejm” elected according to the Round Table agreement.  It was 
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generally agreed that it would have to be replaced with a fully-freely elected 
parliament, but the timing of its demise, and the nature of the electoral system, which 
would replace it, were matters of protracted and bitter dispute.  On both matters, the 
Sejm effectively won out over the president (Millard 1994, pp. 157-158).  President 
Wałęsa dissolved the first (freely elected post-communist) Sejm when the Solidarity 
trade union representatives brought down Suchocka’s government by mistake 
(Jasiewicz 1997, p. 148).  The next three parliaments ran their full course.  In 2004, in 
the aftermath of Miller’s resignation, the opposition tried, but failed, to force the 
president to dissolve the Sejm by refusing to approve his candidate for the 
premiership.  In January 2006, President Kaczyński used the threat to dissolve the 
Sejm on the controversial grounds that the budget had not been passed in time to 
convince two parties to support his party’s minority government without receiving 
any ministerial appointments (Śmiłowicz 2006).   
 
The Sejm has dominated the choice of prime minister.  Five prime ministers were 
clearly choices of the Sejm.  Pawlak (1993), Oleksy and Buzek were the choices of 
clear coalition majorities opposing the president.  Pawlak’s nomination may have 
been an attempt to placate the president and the political opponents of the left more 
generally.  Even so, this was a case of self-restraint.  Olszewski and Suchocka were 
both nominated by the extremely fractious first Sejm.  During that Sejm, Wałęsa’s 
nominee, Pawlak (1992), failed to gather enough support to even propose a cabinet 
(Millard 1994, pp. 104-105).  Kwaśniewski nominated Cimoszewicz, but this was 
considered an uncontroversial choice.  Miller and Kwaśniewski were effectively from 
the same party but Kwaśniewski surely would have nominated another prime minister 
if he had felt able to.  Poland’s first prime minister under semi-presidentialism, 
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Bielecki, was clearly the president’s choice (Podolak 1998, p. 52).  He had only 
minimal support in the contract Sejm, but it lacked the legitimacy and consensus to 
resist the president.  Marek Belka was also a presidential appointment.  Although a 
member of the SLD, he was the president’s, not the party’s, man.  The Sejm initially 
rejected his cabinet.  However, after the Sejm failed to produce an alternative 
candidate, Belka was re-nominated by the president.  Splinter parties from the SLD, 
which had done badly in the 2004 European elections, changed their position, thereby 
giving Belka a majority (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2005, pp. 1154-1155).  
After the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections, Prime Minister 
Marcinkiewicz was appointed in a situation where seems to have been full agreement 
between the president and his twin brother, the head of, Law and Justice (PiS), the 
largest party in the Sejm.  It gained support from other parties without bargaining 
about the premiership. 
 
The Sejm has been even more important in the removal of prime ministers than it has 
in their appointment.  Bielecki, Cimoszewicz, Buzek and Belka were all effectively 
removed from office by parliamentary elections.  Suchocka suffered a vote of no 
confidence.  Oleksy resigned but was anticipating his removal by the Sejm.  President 
Wałęsa had a role in his downfall as he seems to have been partly responsible for 
fomenting accusations that Oleksy was a Russian spy.  Miller resigned when a split 
developed in his party: he too was recognising that he had lost the confidence of the 
Sejm.  In a constitutionally superfluous move, Wałęsa added his name to a motion of 
no-confidence against Olszewski (Jasiewicz 1997, p. 141).  Wałęsa also conspired 
against Pawlak in 1995, but again he could not have been successful without the 
support of the SLD, which was the largest party in the Sejm. 
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President Wałęsa, rather than prime minister Bielecki, was the key person in choosing 
the first semi-presidential cabinet (Podolak 1998, p. 69; Wołek 2004, p. 127).  Since 
then the prime minister has dominated appointments.  Olszewski ignored Wałęsa’s 
insistence that the Jaruzelski-appointed admiral Kołodziejczyk stay on as defence 
minister (Millard 1994, p. 100).  In contrast, his successor Suchocka accepted the 
president’s three nominations in his areas of special responsibility.  While Wałęsa was 
not ideologically opposed to the Olszewski and Suchocka governments, he was 
clearly opposed to Pawlak’s coalition of his own peasant party and the much larger 
post-communist SLD.  The coalition accepted the president’s nomination of three 
ministers, who, to a great extent, stood outside the government.   Later, Wałęsa tried 
to exploit intra-coalition tensions and expand his own powers, when he refused to 
appoint the SLD nomination to replace the finance minister fired by Pawlak (Van der 
Meer Krok-Paszkowska 1999, pp. 182-183).  Eventually, after a prolonged standoff, 
Wałęsa got the SLD to produce a new nomination for finance minister, while he 
accepted coalition-nominated deputy ministers in the presidential ministries.  Under 
president Kwaśniewski the prime minister has had the decisive say.  Nonetheless, the 
president does seem to have had a real influence on SLD appointments (Wiatr et al. 
2003, p. 93).   
 
Both the prime minister and the president are substantial actors in foreign policy.  In 
contrast to domestic affairs, the very strong consensus on foreign affairs in general 
and EU accession in particular makes it difficult to assess the relative roles of 
president and prime minister.  Although there have been conflicts between foreign 
ministers and the president (Millard 2000, pp. 48-49, 51), co-operation in 
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international affairs has generally been harmonious (Wiatr et al. 2003, p. 95).  There 
is a relatively settled division of labour between the government and the president in 
international relations.  The prime minister meets other prime ministers, while the 
president meets other executive presidents. The prime minister attends the European 
Council but the president rather than the prime minister has conducted meetings with 
the American and Russian presidents.   
 
Defence and internal security were the subjects of some of the greatest conflict 
between President Wałęsa and governments (Herspring 2000; Jasiewicz 1997, pp. 
100-103; Millard 1994).  Overall, the president perhaps won most of the rounds.  
However, he never established a clear division of labour with, never mind dominance 
over, the government in this area.  In 1996, Kwaśniewski approved a decisive shift 
towards government and Sejm by reactivating a statute which Wałęsa had previously 
vetoed (Herspring 2000, pp. 93-94).  Conflict over the security services has been more 
important, since Poland’s security services have both autonomously, and under the 
direction of politicians, made vital interventions in the career of political and business 
leaders.  Their actions have frequently set the political agenda under both Wałęsa and 
Kwaśniewski.  In contrast to defence, this is an area in which the government has 
usually managed to outmanoeuvre the president.   
 
The president’s powers of appointment to vital and controversial institutions such as 
the National Bank of Poland and the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiTV) have 
sometimes enabled him to resist the government’s plans in these areas and to bargain 
with the government for other policy changes (Jasiewicz 1997, pp. 151-152; Wiatr et 
al. 2003, p. 93; Wołek 2004, pp. 144-148).  The prime minister’s powers of (non-
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ministerial) appointment are political rather than constitutional.  Party leaders like 
Miller have been able to make huge numbers of appointments throughout the state 
apparatus and the economy (Przasnyski 2002).  When the party leader of the chief 
governing party has stayed outside of government, they have tended to retain control 
of appointments that are formally made by the government or by ministries.   
 
The Polish executive as a whole is a relatively weak legislator for a regime where the 
government is responsible to parliament.  The government has weak powers to protect 
its legislation from parliamentary amendment, and to prevent the passing of bills by 
parliament that contradict government policy.  Within the government, the cabinet 
and the chancellery of the government, centred on the prime minister, have an 
extremely limited capacity to control, never mind direct, the legislative activities of 
ministries.  This is in spite of the frequent use of the urgent procedure.  The Sejm 
never granted the decree power envisaged by the Little Constitution.  The president’s 
involvement in legislation has been marginal (Goetz and Zubek 2005).  However, he 
has been able to successfully veto important bills on a handful of occasions in every 
parliament.  The veto was at its most effective when Kwaśniewski cohabited with the 
weak Buzek government from 1997 to 2001.  In this parliament, 17 out of 24 vetoes 
were successful (Balicki 2001, pp. 144-146; Goetz and Zubek 2005, p. 40) and 
several of these were on vitally important issues. 
 
Effects of the system 
There is a number of putative advantages and disadvantages of semi-presidentialism.  
Advantages include the ability to provide checks and balances within the executive 
and for the president to provide substitute executive authority between governments 
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and when governments are very weak.  The weakening of the party system, policy 
deadlock and delegitimisation are the principal disadvantages.  In this section, I will 
concentrate on delegitimisation as this is the most relevant to democratic 
consolidation. 
 
Delegitimisation is caused by intra-executive conflict.  Intra-executive conflict is 
always possible in semi-presidentialism.  As Linz and Stepan point out, it is especially 
likely when the president is not the leader of a parliamentary majority; when the 
prime minister is not supported by a majority; when the constitutional text is vague; 
and when there is no established constitutional practice (Linz and Stepan 1996, pp. 
278-280).  To this I add when the president has a hyperpolitical conception of his 
office.  All of these conditions pertained from December 1990 to October 1993.  
Arguably, not all of them were removed until the beginning of the Miller government 
in 2001, at which point, the president’s party was in government with a majority 
under a only moderately vague constitution with over one parliamentary term’s 
constitutional practice.    
 
The tendency to question the legitimacy of other groups is a tendency of the Polish 
right-wing: the left were and would always be “communists” and, for some rightists, 
the centre’s initial insistence that a “thick line” be drawn between the present and the 
communist past placed a question mark over their legitimacy.  Wałęsa’s hyperpolitical 
attitude was partly an expression of this right-wing tendency, even though a major 
reason for his conflict with the Olszewski government was its more extreme anti-
communist stance.  Wałęsa tended to question the legitimacy of any political forces 
that disagreed with him, left, right or centre.  The conditions of Polish semi-
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presidentialism tended to facilitate this right-wing tendency to delegitimise, as there 
was a right-wing representation in the presidency or the government from 1990 to 
1995. 
 
The left has frequently revelled in demonstrating its democratic credentials and 
political maturity by maintaining a largely dignified stance in response to right-wing 
attacks on their right to participate in politics and to rule.  Thus, from 1993, the left 
did not conduct aggressive attacks on the legitimacy of the president because of his 
political opinions or background.  When cohabitation returned in 1997, the centre-
right coalition that cohabited with Kwaśniewski, did not suggest that the popular 
president, or his narrowly defeated political party, was straightforwardly illegitimate.  
Nonetheless, the right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action had campaigned on the need 
for a more decisive break with the communist past.  A similar emphasis reappeared in 
the campaign of Law and Justice in 2005.  
 
Related to the right-wing belief in the illegitimacy of its enemies has been a 
reluctance to acknowledge the legitimacy of institutions controlled by those enemies 
or constraining right-wing politicians (Śpiewak 1997, p. 90).  Again, President 
Wałęsa was an extreme case: “[His] chief legal advisor … compared himself to a 
sergeant in the army, who always followed the orders of his commander-in-chief.  In 
other words, his philosophy was ‘every decision of the president may be justified 
legally’” (Jasiewicz 1997, p. 155).  Related to the reluctance to acknowledge existing 
institutions was a preference for substantial constitutional revisions.  This lack of 
certainty undermined the legitimacy of institutions, even among actors who did not 
share Wałęsa’s instrumental attitude to the law.  Notably, some on the left argued for 
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the abolition of the elected presidency until a relatively late date.  Again, the election 
of Kwaśniewski reduced this type of conflict.  The 1997 Constitution was fiercely 
contested by the right, which in its mainstream form had no parliamentary 
representation during the drafting process.  However, the main conflicts in advance of 
the Constitution’s finalisation were about its symbolic elements rather than its 
fundamental political institutional architecture (Sanford 2002, pp. 90-91).  While the 
currently governing Law and Justice party favours a more presidential regime, all 
major blocs have in practice accepted the Constitution’s overall balance between 
president, government and Sejm.  There is little prospect any proposal achieving a 
two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of the Sejm and Senate necessary for 
constitutional change (Majda 2006). 
 
Amongst the political elite, the questioning of the legitimacy of actors and institutions 
did not extend to the questioning of democracy, defined as the choice of society’s 
principal decision-makers through free and fair elections under universal suffrage.  No 
substantial anti-democratic force has existed in post-communist Poland.  Neither has 
there been a debate about the replacement of democracy, even with some sort of 
hybrid of authoritarianism and democracy.  To be sure, there have been calls for 
“strong leadership”.  Wałęsa proudly compared himself to Marshal Piłsudski, who 
lead Poland to independence in 1918, but then staged a coup against a fragmented and 
ineffective parliament in 1926.  Nonetheless, Wałęsa never contemplated the 
replacement of elections with some other method of choosing leaders.  Rather, he, and 
some others on the right, misunderstood, or refused to acknowledge, that democracy 
is a set of procedures that depends upon the rule of law. 
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The president’s special responsibility for defence provided a particularly dangerous 
arena for the delegitimisation of actors, institutions and democracy itself amongst 
political elites.  Doubts about the legitimacy of other actors were especially powerful 
with regard to national security.  This was the central issue in the clash between 
Olszewski’s defence minister Parys, who wanted to purge the army of communists, 
and Wałęsa, who tended to accept that the military was loyal to the new regime.  This 
and other conflicts over the military were among the most spectacular examples of 
mutual delegitimisation by the central institutions of democracy.  The conflict over 
the military also escalated to a point where it began to threaten the democratic 
consensus itself.   At the notorious Drawsko lunch in 1994, President Wałęsa asked 
generals to vote on whether “the civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defence should 
be recalled?” (Herspring 2000, p. 92).  This episode is the closest Poland got to a coup 
and was a direct result of intra-executive conflict. 
 
There is good evidence that politicians’ attempts to delegitimise each other and the 
institutions they operated had an impact on public opinion.  Like their elite 
counterparts, survey respondents who identify themselves as right-wing have denied 
the legitimacy of their political opponents by supporting “lustration” and 
“decommunisation” policies (Szawiel 1999, p. 125; Szczerbiak 2002, pp. 559-561).  
This hostility has continued into the contemporary period.  Comparative data shows, 
that at least in terms of right-left self-placement Poland a highly polarised polity, even 
more polarised than some Western European systems in the era of powerful 
communist parties (Szawiel 1999, pp. 131-132). 
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It seems likely that intra-executive conflict has contributed directly to the popular 
delegitimisation of institutions.  The early period of semi-presidentialism brought 
about a plunge in popular approval of parliament, the government and the presidency 
(Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 284).  Trust in government and the president in Poland was 
much lower than other East-Central European countries, in spite of a much higher 
approval of the economic system amongst Poles (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 286).  
However, there was huge increase in trust in the presidency under Kwaśniewski 
(Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch 1998, pp. 116-117).  It is difficult to disentangle Linz 
and Stepan’s conditions for semi-presidential stability and the new president’s 
undoubted political talents as explanations for this increase.  In most polls, 
respondents were invited to give credit directly to Kwaśniewski himself (Centrum 
Badania Opinii Społecznej 2005; Cybulska et al. 2000, pp. 68-69).  Government and 
parliament have never recovered their public prestige as the presidency has done, but 
some sources register an improvement since the establishment of the first majority 
government in late 1993 (Cybulska et al. 2000; Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch 1998, 
pp. 116-117).  Moreover, since that date governments, and prime ministers, have had 
a substantial honeymoon period during which they have enjoyed the widespread 
public support (Cybulska et al. 2000, p. 70), although from an initially seemingly 
strong position the right-wing-led government of Buzek (1997 to 2001) and the left-
wing-led government of Miller (2001 to 2004) have ended up as more unpopular than 
the highly fragmented governments of 1991 to 1993.  The lack of trust in Polish 
institutions is no longer exceptional in a regional context, as other countries have 
descended to Poland’s level (Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch 1998, pp. 116-117).   
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The early period of semi-presidentialism coincided with a decrease in support for 
democracy.  In 1991, the number of those with a “negative assessment” of the 
political situation climbed permanently above those with a “positive assessment”.  
However, from 1996 to 1999, the dominant perception was that the situation is 
“neither good, nor bad” (Sęk 2000, p. 43).  Also, from 1991 there was a rarely any but 
the slimmest majority for those who think that the political situation will improve 
over those who think it will worsen (Sęk 2000, p. 44).  In the early semi-presidential 
period, Polish people were less likely to reject undemocratic alternatives than were 
their counterparts in the region and in other new democracies (Linz and Stepan 1996, 
pp. 284-286; Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch 1998, pp. 109-110).  However, there has 
been a noticeable, but neither huge nor steady, reduction in such undemocratic 
opinions in the years since majority government was first established (Wiatr et al. 
2003, pp. 274-276).  By 1999, the European Values Survey indicated that Polish 
support for democracy was not substantially different from that in Western Europe 
(Wiatr et al. 2003, p. 284). 
 
Semi-presidentialism and other factors  
The pacted transition in Poland is often blamed for general difficulties in democratic 
consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996).  It is also possible to minimise the independent 
effect of semi-presidentialism by dismissing it as an element of the pacted transition.  
However, semi-presidentialism was an effect of an unnecessary transformation of the 
dual executive of the Roundtable agreement.  Had the timing of Wałęsa’s bid for the 
presidency been slightly different he might have opted for his original plan for 
parliamentary election, or the idea of popular election could have been blocked by 
liberal and post-communist elements who favoured parliamentarism.  The pact itself 
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was no longer directly relevant once both presidency and parliament had been freely 
elected.  Semi-presidentialism was perhaps at its most damaging when Wałęsa faced 
the Olszewski government.  Although Round Table agreement established a dual 
executive, Polish semi-presidentialism cannot be dismissed as an epiphenomenon of 
the pacted transition. 
 
Obviously, a plethora of factors have affected Polish democratisation.  A key factor in 
Polish democratisation has been elite consensus on the profoundly interlinked issues 
of democracy, the market economy and international relations.  I will concentrate on 
elite consensus, because of its general importance, but also because of its relevance to 
the delegitimating effects of semi-presidentialism.  To a great extent, this consensus 
developed in a complex interrelationship with the idiosyncratic nature of party-state-
society relations in Poland.  However, it was finally established by the Round Table 
agreement.  The Round Table was based on the communist leadership’s acceptance 
that some measure of democratisation was necessary to push through solutions to 
Poland’s protracted and worsening economic crisis.  In preparation for the Round 
Table, Jaruzelski and the leadership had won a major victory over the more 
conservative apparatus.  The Solidarity opposition accepted that democratisation 
would be limited in the short-term because the communist apparatus could not be 
completely ignored and Poland’s international situation as part of the Soviet bloc.  
The unexpected results of the Polish election and its aftermath played a key role in the 
collapse of communism regionally, and the virtual disappearance of a Soviet 
constraint on the political and economic structures of Poland.  The electorate’s 
comprehensive rejection of communist leaders further strengthened the younger 
reformists, who were committed to full democratic, market and Western-oriented 
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policies (Grzymała-Busse 2002).  The election and the regional changes also 
facilitated a radical economic programme of “shock therapy”, which not only gained 
vital support from the West but also played a role in making Poland economically 
dependent on the West.  The economic programme was so rapid and comprehensive 
in many spheres, that it largely prevented the emergence of a powerful quasi-capitalist 
class with an interest in stalling economic reform at a permanently transitional phase, 
a policy that in some of Poland’s neighbours required ambivalence about political 
democracy and pro-Western international relations (Hellman 1998; Vachudova 2005).  
The West preferred democratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.  A relatively 
consolidated democracy was a condition for accession to the European Union.  
Therefore, by the time semi-presidentialism began to operate in Poland, an important 
element of democratic consolidation had already been achieved: for Poland’s elites, 
democracy was the only “game in town”.  There was virtually no discussion, never 
mind agitation for, any alternative.  Moreover, this consensus was buttressed by 
somewhat weaker agreement amongst the vast majority of the elite on the market 
economy and a Westward shift in international relations.  Ironically, the dual 
executive was a key part of the deal that established this consensus. 
 
This consensus meant that semi-presidential institutions were never consciously used 
to undermine democracy.  The substantial consensus about economics and foreign 
affairs limited the amount of conflict over these questions, and the resulting relative 
consistency in policy improved the economic and diplomatic performance of the 
regime, during a period when the regime’s legitimacy was quite sensitive to its 
performance.  From virtually the beginning, Poland’s new democracy was 
consolidated in the sense that for elites “democracy was the only game in town”.  It 
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was not consolidated in the sense of an overwhelming consensus on the actual 
institutions of democracy until much later.  Regardless, of the consensus on 
democracy itself, semi-presidentialism created incentives for conflict about basic 
issues of institutional design.  This concrete element of democratic consolidation was 
arguably not achieved until a full parliamentary term had run under the 1997 
Constitution.  By general European standards, political rhetoric in Poland is 
particularly bitter, and procedural manoeuvres particularly aggressive. Most Poles 
wearily dismiss this behaviour as the nature of the “political game” and although it 
reflects party political polarisation, it probably does not indicate that Polish politicians 
have not accepted the basic constitutional settlement.  
 
Popular attitudes to the democratic system as a whole did not converge with those in 
consolidated democracies until approximately the same date.  Popular attitudes to the 
institutions of democracy have still not converged, with the exception of the 
presidency (and this might be an effect of the extraordinary popularity of 
Kwaśniewski).  This comparatively negative popular attitude to political institutions is 
a general feature of post-communist democracy (Gerskovits 1998; Rose, Mishler, and 
Haerpfer 1998), even though Poland is usually shown to be an outlier in terms of its 
particularly negative attitude to parties.   
 
Conclusion 
Semi-presidentialism in Poland interacted with the constitutional and party system as 
well as the personality of the president.  In the early, and most crucial years, of Polish 
democratisation, none of these conditions was supportive of stable semi-
presidentialism.  In more recent, and less crucial, years, most of the conditions of 
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stable semi-presidentialism have been present.  In the early years, semi-
presidentialism generated damaging conflicting legitimacies, while in later years it 
has played a relatively positive role. Overall, the main effect of semi-presidentialism 
seems to have been to delay democratic consolidation, in terms of agreement on 
concrete institutions, by several years.  It may also have had a lasting negative effect 
on the quality of Polish democracy, but this is more difficult to gauge.  A firm elite 
consensus on democracy, together with a supportive consensus on economics and 
international relations, prevented semi-presidential conflict from seriously threatening 
the democratic system.   
 
Nonetheless, it is not too difficult to suggest a counterfactual in which semi-
presidential conflict would have provided a much sterner test of the democratic 
consensus.  Ironically, the grossly disproportional election of 1993 facilitated a short 
and long-term stabilisation of Polish politics.   In the short-term, there was a freely 
elected majority government for the first time.  In the longer-term, there was a 
“constitutional coalition” with a sufficiently large number of seats, and sufficiently 
few parties, to write a constitution that would eliminate many of the institutional 
causes of conflict.  In the quite likely scenario that slightly lower electoral thresholds 
had been adopted, or that right-wing parties had reacted a little more presciently to the 
incentives presented by the new system, the new parliament could have looked much 
more like its predecessor.  Another few years of political chaos could have eroded the 
democratic consensus.  Moreover, at this time, the economy was only beginning to 
stabilise and the European Union had not yet begun to exert active leverage on the 
political systems of East and Central Europe.  However, as it was, Poland 
consolidated democracy in spite of semi-presidentialism. 
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Table 1: 
Constitutional Powers of Polish Presidents according to Shugart and Carey’s Scheme 
 Amended 1952 
Constitution 
Little Constitution (1992) 1997 Constitution 
Legislative Powers 
Package Veto Veto with 2/3 majority override (2) 
Veto with 2/3 majority 
override (2) 
Veto with 3/5 majority 
override (1) 
Partial Veto None (0) None (0) None (0) 
Decree powers 
Outside of parliamentary 
session (but parliament 
was permanently in 
session) (2) 
None (0) None (0) 
Budgetary 
powers None (0) None (0) None (0) 
Reserved Policy 
Areas None (0) None (0) None (0) 
Proposal of 
Referenda No (0) 
With approval of absolute 
majority of Senate (2) 
With approval of 
absolute majority of 
Senate (2) 
Non-Legislative Powers 
Cabinet 
formation 
President nominates 
prime minister; prime 
minister must consult 
president prior to 
nomination of ministers; 
cabinet subject to 
assembly investiture (2?) 
President has first right to 
nominate premier; prime 
minister must consult prior 
to nomination of ministers 
of foreign affairs, defence 
and the interior; assembly 
can nominate its own 
candidate premier; cabinet 
subject to assembly 
investiture (2?) 
President has first right 
to nominate premier; 
assembly can nominate 
its own candidate 
premier; cabinet 
subject to assembly 
investiture (1) 
Cabinet 
dismissal 
Can propose dismissal of 
prime minister to 
assembly (2) 
No powers (0) No powers (0) 
Censure Unrestricted censure (0) 
President can respond to 
non-constructive censure by 
dissolving assembly; 
cabinet must resign if Sejm 
refuses to sign off on 
government’s accounts (2) 
“Constructive” vote of 
no-confidence (1) 
Dissolution of 
Assembly 
Restricted: only if budget, 
socio-economic 
programme or 
government are not 
approved in the requisite 
period or if the Sejm 
passes motion preventing 
the president from 
carrying out his 
responsibilities regarding 
the sovereignty and 
security of the state and 
its international 
obligations  (1) 
Restricted: only if budget or 
government are not 
approved in the requisite 
period (1) 
Restricted: only if 
budget or government 
are not approved in the 
requisite period (1) 
Total 9/40 9/40 6/40 
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Table 2: 
 
Presidents and Prime Ministers  
 
Dates President Prime 
Minister 
Parties in 
government 
Relationship of 
government to 
president 
Relationship of 
government to 
Sejm 
Jan. 1991-
Nov. 1991 
 
Lech Wałęsa 
(Solidarity, non-
party): politically 
hyperactive 
conception of 
presidency 
Jan Krzysztof 
Bielecki 
(KLD) 
KLD, PC, 
ZChN, 
Presidential Minority (but 
Sejm illegitimate) 
Dec. 
1991-June 
1992 
 Jan Olszewski 
(PC) 
PC, ZChN, PL  Cohabitation Minority 
June-July 
1992 
 Waldemar 
Pawlak (PSL) 
NA Cohabitation Government never 
approved by Sejm 
July 1992- 
Oct. 1993 
 Hanna 
Suchocka 
(UD) 
UD, KLD, 
ZChN, PChD, 
SLCh, PPG, PL 
Cohabitation Minority 
Nov. 
1993-June 
1995 
 
 Waldemar 
Pawlak (PSL) 
SLD, PSL Cohabitation Majority 
June-Dec. 
1995 
 
 Józef Oleksy 
(SLD) 
SLD, PSL Cohabitation Majority 
Nov.-Dec. 
1995 
Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski 
(SLD, non-
party): strategic 
conception of 
presidency 
Józef Oleksy 
(SLD) 
SLD, PSL Presidential Majority 
Jan. 1996-
Sept. 1997 
 Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz 
(SLD) 
SLD, PSL Presidential Majority 
Oct. 1997-
June 2000 
 Jerzy Buzek 
(AWS) 
AWS, UW Cohabitation Majority 
July 2000-
Sept. 2001 
 Jerzy Buzek 
(AWS) 
AWS Cohabitation Minority 
Oct. 2001-
Feb. 2003 
 Leszek Miller 
(SLD) 
SLD, PSL Presidential Majority 
Mar. 
2003-Apr. 
2004 
 
 Leszek Miller 
(SLD) 
SLD Presidential Minority 
May 
2004- 
June 2004 
 
 Marek Belka 
(SLD) 
SLD Presidential  Minority 
July 2004-
Oct 2005 
 Marek Belka 
(SLD) 
SLD, SDPL Presidential Minority 
November 
2005 - 
Lech Kaczyński 
(PiS): active 
conception of 
presidency? 
Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz 
(PiS) 
PiS Presidential Minority 
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KLD – Liberal Democratic Congress; PC – Centre Alliance; ZChN – Christian National Union; PL – Peasant 
Alliance; UD- Democratic Union; PChD – Party of Christian Democrats; SLCh – Christian-Peasant Party; PPG 
– Polish Economic Programme; SLD – Democratic Left Alliance; PSL – Polish Peasant Party; AWS – 
Solidarity Electoral Action; UW – Freedom Union; SDPL – Polish Social Democracy; PiS – Law and Justice 
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